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NAPOLEON AND THE AGE OF NATIONALISM HANS KOHN
A SINCERE patriotism, a deep attachment to the soil and people of France, inspired Robespierre. It provided a moving lyrical undertone to the tragic sternness of his reports: "Yes, this delightful land which we inhabit and which nature caresses with love is made tobe the domain of liberty and happiness; this sensitive and proud people is truly born for glory and virtue.
O my fatherland, if fate had caused me to be born in a foreign and distant country, I would have addressed heaven continuously with wishes for thy prosperity; I would have been moved to tears by the recital of thy combats and thy virtues; my attentive soul would have followed with a restless ardor all the movements of thy glorious revolution; I would have envied the fate of thy citizens; I would have envied that of thy representatives. I am French, I am one of thy representatives.
... 0 sublime people! Accept the sacrifices of my whole being; happy is the man who is born in your midst; happier is he who can die for your happiness.", This feeling for France was unknown to Napoleon. At no time in his life had he the desire to die for the happiness of the French people. He knew patriotic sentiments in his youth: the rhetorical patriotism of a late-eighteenth-century adolescence which had been instructed by the classics and Rousseau. It was, however, a patriotism directed against France. Napoleon the Corsican shared his fellow-countrymen's hatred of their I '"Rapport sur les rapports des idees r6ligieuses et morales avec les principes r6publicains, et sur les fetes nationales," i8 flor6al, an 11 (I794), p. 6. peror Leopold II, remarked that Burke "has said something very stupid, for this void is a volcano, the subterranean agitations and approaching eruptions of which no one could neglect for a moment without imprudence." He predicted incalculable earthquakes and innumerable grave consequenices from the streams of lava that were to pour down on neighboring countries. Even more clearly than tion and mankind, were but instruments of his destiny.
The same quest for an efficient government that brought about the Revolution in I789 helped Napoleon to power ten years later. The French longed for a strong man who would safeguard the main achievements of the Revolution in orderly security and stabilize the new frontiers and glorious conquests in peace.
Of all the institutions of the young republic, the army alone possessed the prestige and the power to achieve this.
Of its young generals, Buonaparte appeared the most promising. I-le did not disappoint the country's expectations. A man of rare vitality and capacity for work, of penetrating intelligence and prodigious mernory, he proved a great administrator and organizer, continuing the line of enlightened monarchs of the eighteenth century and surpassing them by far, the last and the greatest of them. Like them, he did not understand and had no use for nationalism and the new popular forces. Like them, he believed in the state, in direction from above, in efficiency and rational order. But unlike the greatest of them, he did regard himself less the first servant of the state than its master. The state was the vehicle and instrument of his personal destiny. His primary end was not the welfare of his subjects or the raison d'etat of France and not, except for brief moments, the perpetuation and glory of his dynasty.
All these limited goals he accepted and from time to time promoted each one or all of them, but they did not satisfy or contain him. His ambitions knew no definite limits; his acti'vities had no fixed and stable direction. He felt his will was strong enough to triumph over the nature of man and the nature of things alike. To him, the impossible was only "a phantom of the timid soul and the refuge of the coward." Despite his youthful Rousseauan nationalism, he was an eighteenth-century cosmopolitan for whom civilization was one and the world the stage; in other respects he anticipated the twentieth century. He set the earliest and greatest example in modern times for the potentialities of the cult of force that found so many adherents in the extreme movements of socialism and nationalism a hundred years after his death. The words of this eighteenth-century man of genius sound sometimes like pronouncements of our times: "There is only one secret for world leadership, namely, to be strong' because in strength there is neither error nor illusion: it is naked truth." "Succeed! I judge men only by the results of their acts." He was a dynamic force, for whom "the world is but an occasion to act dangerously."4
Though his daring had ultimately to fail, it built much that lasted. Unlike the typical eighteenth-century man, Napoleon did not know moderation, nor could his temperament accommodate itself to peace. He did not believe in harmony but in mastery, not in coimpromise but in struggle and decision. In I803, after the Treaty of Amiens, France had everything it could desire, but Napoleon was unwilling for it to become a great state among other states and for himself to be a king equal to 4 Georges LEFEBvRE, Napoleon (Paris, 1935) The constitutional liberties for which I789 and the nineteenth century strove meant little to Napoleon. He did not deny them; he denatured them. He paid lip service to universal suffrage and deprived the people of any effective vote.
With supreme contempt, he drew up many meaningless constitutions and had them confirmed by plebiscite. The people had no share in the government of their affairs; their public spirit was not encouraged. Yet in his declarations, he always took care to emphasize his wish to "rattacher les grandes autorites de l'etat A la masse de la nation, d'oiu derive necessairement toute autorite nationale." But he admitted, no doubt, that as "'6l1u du peuple" he alone represented the majority of the nation. He praised democracy if it was democracy on his terms-"true" democracy. Napoleon's effective coups d'etat with their subsequent plebiscitarian endorsements did not strengthen French respect for constitutional legality. The order which he undoubtedly His reforms confined themselves mainly to higher schools for the training of capable and loyal civil servants. "Public instruction," declared Pierre Louis, Comte
Roederer, who was put in charge in I802 of all affairs concerning it, "can and miust be a very powerful machine in our political system. Through it the legislator will be able to re-create a national spirit and then to make use of it himself." The con5Napoleon treated painters in a similar way. They were attached as officers to the armies of the First Consul. "Militarized artists, submitted to the strictest discipline, they had nothing to paint but glorious battle scenes-which caused them to be called 'painters of victories'-and they could not paint them according to their inspiration; they could choose neither the day nor the hour nor the composition of the picture, and their talent was circumscribed by minute regulations worked out by offices which had little concern with art, even if one admits that it was not completely strange to them. Napoleon centralized education, as he centralized the state. The decree of March I 7, I8o8 organized the "University," the general corporation charged with the direction of the political and moral formation of French youth. Its bases were the teachings of the Catholic religion; loyalty to the emperor and the imperial monarchy, the depository of the happiness of the people, and to the Napoleonic dynasty,-the preserver of the unity of France and of all the liberal ideas proclaimed by the constitutions; and obedience to teachers and parents.
For Napoleon more and rm-ore only the official world existed, the armor of the state; for the nation and its intellectual life he had little use. He underestimated their importance, both in France and abroad.
In a speech to the senate, Napoleon said on July 9, i8io, "A new order of things now guides the universe." This order, though rational in its outline and efficient in its application, broke upon the one obstacle which it did not take into account: the human element, the popular reluctance to accept the imposed form. Napoleon's society was planned by a great strategist in the camp of a victorious army. Distrusting spontaneous manifestations of liberty, he regarded the order of the army and the discipline and dan of war as an antidote to social anarchy; he did not see that long wars in themselves threaten to produce anarchy and to destroy much of the substance on which every living order must be based. He tried to compensate the French with economic activity for the political immobility that he imposed. Napoleon appealed to the ambitious self-love of the French that the success of the Revolutionary armies had fanned, to their feeling of superiority. He wished his rule to be "a dictatorship of persuasion based upon popularity."6 To some, he promised to continue the gains and heroism of the Revolution; to others, he appeared as a conservative force. "So artfully was the system of Buonaparte contrived, that each of the numerous classes of Frenchmen found something in it congenial to his habits, his feeling, or his circumstances, providing only he was willing to sacrifice to it the-essential part of his political principles.... To all these parties, Buonaparte held out the same hopes under the same conditions.-'All these things will I give you, if you will kneel down and worship me!' Shortly afterwards, he was enabled to place before them to whom the choice was submitted, the original temptation in its full extent-a display of the kingdoms of the earth, over which he offered to extend the empire of France, providing always he was himself acknowledged as the object of general obedience, and al-most adoration."7
The dynamism of Napoleon's temperament did not allow him to formulate and follow a consistent foreign policy, conformming to the interests of the French state, as Cardinal Richelieu had done.
His aspirations led him in too many directions. Everywhere he found England in his way, whether he tried to expand throughout Europe or to re-create the Mediterranean empire of the Romans that he, himself a Mediterranean, regarded as his legacy. From his earliest years, his glance had embraced distant lands and his plans mapped out roads for fu-ture adventure. When he started for Egypt in April I 798 as general-in-chief of the Army of the Orient, he carried with him a directive to "drive out the English from all their possessions in the Orient,"
to cut the isthmus of Suez and to take all necessary measures to assure the French Republic free and exclusive possession of the Red Sea. The daring march to the Pyramids and across the Sinai Desert was motivated not by the arbitrariness of a freebooter but by the logic of a great vision: to make Egypt the starting point, as it had been with Alexander and Caesar, for the conquest of Asia, for an advance toward India, for a decisive battle in the heart of the new British empire. Successful, Napoleon would have attained the triumph of vast land masses over sea power, the reopening and control of the ancient land routes to the East, the revival of the decayed civilizations and glories of the Levant and the Orient. This "mirage" of a renaissance of the lands long relegated to obscurity by the rise of oceanic sea power beckoned him on all his life. It was inextricably linked with his hostility to Britain, the mistress of the sea, and his jealousy of Russia, the ermpire of the East, for Napoleon himself vacillated between recreating the empire of the West-and protecting it and its Mediterranean civilization against the threats from the north and the east-and the limitless horizons of the earth. In the twenty years of his career he had to confine himself to uniting Europe; he was stopped at the Channel and on the snow fields of Russia from going beyond. But at the beginning of the age of nationalism stands its denial in Napoleon's universal empire, a vision that was taken up again only at the end of the age by Lenin and Hitler.
When Napoleon in I804 assumed the title of "Emperor of the French," many regarded this step as a betrayal of the Revolution. The Revolutionary hero seemed dead, buried under glittering uniforms and high-sounding titles, church incense and court ceremonial. Beethoven tore up the dedication of his Third symphony to General Buonaparte and replaced his name by the lament, "To the memory of a great man." Stendhal, watching the coronation ceremonies in Paris, looked with disgust at the emperor as a new Caesar and called his accommodation with the pope "an alliance of all the charlatans." He "rinsed out the bad taste" in his mouth by reading Victor Alfieri, the revolutionary nationalist of eighteenth-century Italy.8 In reality, Napoleon never ceased to incarnate truly one aspect of the French Revolution: its universalism and its quest for efficient government. To other aspects like nationalism and liberalism he often paid lip service, but he found little use for them in his actions. His own nature drove him to disregard or misinterpret the forces of liberty long before he became emperor.9 He did not revive the title of king, because it seemed to imply an abdication of popular sovereignty, while the title "Emperor" flattered the nation and its desire for glory without alarmr.ing it unduly. It preserved the feeling that national sovereignty was unimpaired-"My policy consists in ruling men according to the rule of the great majority. In this way I believe one recognizes the sovereignty of the people"1Io0-and did not recall the 9 That he became one, while the "great leaders" of the twentieth century, Hitler and Stalin, did not, was due to the different circumstances of the two periods. In Napoleon's time nationalism lhad not yet sufficiently consolidated nations, nor was it possible to elaborate a doctrine for the masses or forge a mass party, so that a hereditary dynasty seemed the only guarantee of continuity. An eighteenth-century agnostic, Napoleon was willing to use the church to support order and morality among his subjects and to solidify his reign. He regarded it as an institution of his empire and the pope as an imperial official.
"Paris was to be the metropolis of Christendom, the center and guide of the religious as well as of the political world."" To the Ecclesiastical Committee he declared on March i6, i8i i: "The present epoch carries us back to the time of Charlemagne. All the kingdoms, principalities, and duchies which formed themselves out of the debris of the empire have been rejuvenated under our laws.
The church of my empire is the church of the Occident and of almost the whole of Christendom." He announced the convocation of a Council of the Occident in order that "the church of my empire be one in its discipline, as it is in its faith."
When he annexed the Papal States on May I7, I809, he did so on the strength of the theory that the secular domain of the pope had been a fief of Charlemagne, "Empereur des Fran?ais et notre auguste predecesseur," and that the true sovereignty remained with the donor and his heirs, who could revoke or modify the gift. The expenses of the papal office were charged to the imperial budget, and the autonomy of the Gallican church of I682 was extended to the church in the whole empire.
In i8i i this empire, with its frontiers on the Elbe, the Ebro, and the Adriatic Sea, was practically coextensive with that of Charlemagne. French prefects administered its affairs in Rome and The Belgians recognized the good qualities of the new administration, its useful innovations, and the security it afforded to the rising spirit of enterprise and individual advancement; but they suffered from a lack of civil liberties, and they felt the French administrators to be aliens. Napoleon carried out the program of enlightened absolutism that Joseph II had tried to implant in Belgium, and its reforms, rejected twenty years before, were now accepted. But the measures of frenchification of instruction and administration and the conflict with the Catholic church alienated many Belgians. Religious publications like the Jerussalems herstelling (i8i i) by the priest Stichelbaut kept love of the mother-tongue and devotion to the church alive. When the French occupation ended with the allied victories in the spring of I8I4, the Belgians did not aid the French, nor did they, like the Dutch, rise against them. A return to the old regime was unacceptable to the younger generation grown up during the last twenty years; most of the people did not wish to abandon the achievements of the Napoleonic era; but the Belgians had no national program of their own, for Napoleon's regime nowhere directly encouraged the growth of spontaneous group activity and of national sentiment, though indirectly it prepared for it.
Napoleon was ready to use national aspirations as far as they seemed to fit into his system, without having any sincere desire to satisfy them. He never thought seriously of an independent Poland or an independent Italy, though from time to time he gave vague encouragement to those who believed in them. For him nations had no reality of their own. lIe created and dissolved new states incessantly and shifted frontiers and rulers restlessly. the German demand for unity to his own profit. "Certainly, if heaven had willed that I be born a German prince, I would infallibly have governed thirty million united Germans; and from what I think I know of them, I believe that, once they had elected and proclaimed me, they would never have abandoned me, and I would not be here now." Napoleon believed that he might have led a willing and obedient German nation to dominion over Europe. Little in these words betrays any attachment to France or to the happiness of peoples. But at the same time he sounded a different note: "Le premier souverain qui, au milieu de la premiere grande mel6e, embrassera de bonne foi la cause des peuples, se trouvera a la tete de toute l'Europe et pourra tenter tout ce qu'il voudra." Napoleon III certainly reir:embered these words. Yet, even provided that the interests of the various nations and of the whole of Europe did not conflict, the leader of the peoples and of the whole continent might have discovered that it was difficult under any circumstances to attempt whatever he desired.'6 The cult of force and of limitless emrrpire dominated Napoleon's mind to the last: his dream did not change on St. Helena. With greater sincerity he told Benjamin Constant a few months before he had to leave France: "I wished for the empire of the world, and to insure it unlimited power was necessary to me. To govern France alone, a constitution may be better."I7 The age of nationalism rejected the emperor of the world and demanded constitutions. Concretely, Napoleon's European union, his Continental System, was a weapon in his struggle with England. "Let us be masters of the Channel for only six hours, and we shall be masters of the world." In this struggle, he claimed to represent the interests of mankind and to defend the liberties of all peoples. These peoples, however, did not agree: they feared Napoleon and the French much would always be the strongest, would never think of commerce. It is experience which, in demonstrating to him that war-this is to say, the employment of his force against that of another-is exposed to various resistances and checks, leads him to have recourse to commerce -that is to say, to a more pleasant and certain way of compelling the interests of others to consent to what accommodates his own interest. ... Carthage, fighting with Rome in ancient times, had to succumb; it had the force of circumstances against it. But if the fight between Rome and Carthage were taking place today, Carthage would have the universe on its side. Elle aurait pour allies les mceurs actuelles et le genie du monde.
Nor did he encounter opposition from
Napoleon showed some understanding of English liberty, but he rejected the possibility of its application in France. '9 In the case of a nation like the everything is influenced by pub the actions of the Minister of S lutions of Parliament, it will be easily understood that the press enjo-ys unlimited freedom. Our constitutions, on the other hand, do not require the interference of the people in state affairs. If the people were not satisfied with this, the existing organization would have to be completely altered; but it has been proved that such a force of public opinion produces nothing but confusion and excitement, so that a strict surveillance of the press would have to be set up.
On St. Helena, Napoleon expressed himself m1ore enthusiastically about liberty and the English nodel. Aware of the contradiction between his words and his acts, he pointed out:20
There is no comparison between my situation and that of the English government. England is able to work on a soil which extends to the very bowels of the earth; while I could labor only on sandy surface. England reigns over an estab] ished order of things; while I had to take upon myself the great charge, the immense difficulty, of conciliating and establishing. I purified the revolution, in spite of hostile factions. I combined together all the scattered benefits that could be preserved; but I was obliged to protect them with a nervous arm against the attacks of all parties; and in this situation it may truly be said that the public interest, the state, was my- He had no racial prejudice. RepeatedIly he suggested as the best way of establishing peace and civilization in the colonies the encouragement of intermarriage between whites and blacks. To that end he proposed to authorize polygamy, provided that every man took wives of different colors, so that the children of each, brought up under the samne roof and upon the same footing, would from their infancy learn to consider themselves as equal and in the ties of relationship forget difference of color.22 On St. Helena he regretted the expedition to Santo Domingo. "I ought to have treated with the black chieftains; I ought to have appointed Negroes as officers in their regiments, and nmade Toussaint l'Ouverture viceroy."'2 Not only did he give equality to the Jews, but he welcomed their influx into France. In his opinion they supplied good soldiers for the French army, and great wealth was brought to France through them. He was convinced that if his empire had lasted, many more Jews would have imnmigrated to France, for all the Jews would gradually have come to settle in a country where equality of laws was assured to them and where all honors stood open to them.24 What Napoleon demanded was loyal and obedient subjects, useful to the state; as long as they were that, he did not inquire into their religion, race, or nationality.
This emphasis on equality made Na- To end civil discord, you chose as your head a man who appeared on the world stage with the marks of greatness on him. You put all your hopes in him; those hopes have been betrayed; on the ruins of anarchy, he founded nothing but despotism. He should at least, out of gratitude, have become a Frenchman with you. That he has never been.... He knew not how to rule, neither in the national interest, nor in the interest of his despotism. He destroyed whatever he wished to create, and recreated whatever he wished to destroy. He believed only in force; today he is overthrown by force: just retribution for his insensate ambition. , I92I) , I, 292: "It was no longer a public matter-one had no personal connection with it, and one was not allowed to inquire about it: the emperor had made such an effort to make it his affair and not ours, that one had finally taken him at his word. And, whatever people may have been saying about him for the last few years, in I8I4 everybody, including his army and officials, was so tired that they asked for nothing but to be relieved from an effort that had ceased to be directed by a wise and reasonable will.' obliterated those principles that our Revolution had inculcated in us. From this resulted a deep torpor of the sentiments which are most natural to us. For a long time his success took the place of patriotism for us; but, as he had absorbed the whole nation within him, the whole nation fell with him. And, in our fall, we did not know, in the face of our enemies, how to be anything more than he had made us.
There still survived republican patriots who had fallen into disfavor with Napoleon because of their outspoken criticism. One of them was Lazare Carnot, who had voted against the establishment of a hereditary monarchy by Napoleon.
In his speech on that occasion he ernphasized that he could not consent to regard liberty, a good so superior to all others and without which the others were nothing, as but an illusion. "My heart tells n-me that liberty is possible, that a free regimne is easy to maintain and that it is more stable than any arbitrary govern- The French, Carnot went on to say, would hardly believe in the possibilities of patriotism if they had not seen its development in England,. where all private fortunes were tied up with the comiimon good and where, therefore, everyone was strongly interested in the general welfare. France must develop, he believed, a similar patriotism, though its focus would be different. "England makes it a point of honor to regard herself as the center of great niaritime enterprises which unite all nations; France must make it hers to profit from the gifts with which nature has prodigiously endowed her." He demanded a loving attachment to French soil and its cultivation without any wish for rivalry with the British in foreign trade, supremacy in which was assured to the latter for a very long time by geographic position and the balance of power in Europe. Such a love of the fatherland, Carnot believed, would unite the various national forces in a common sentiment and task and preserve them from adventures and conquest.3' At the same time, two of the most in-:fluential thinkers of the coming generation, Claude-Henri Saint-Simon, the great visionary of early socialism, and Augustin Thierry, his disciple and the future historian, published in October I8I4 De la re'organisation de la societe europe'enne, in which they regarded an Anglo-French alliance as desirable but impossible. Half a year later, in their Opinion sur les mesures a" prendre contre la coalition de I815, they proposed to found a new Europe on an alliance be-3I A. AuLARD, "Les idees politiques de Carnot," Revolution franCaise, XIV (i888), 640-58; and Rene GIRARD, "Carnot et 1' education populaire pendant les Cent Jours," Revolution franCaise, LII (1907), 424-48. tween the two nations. Such co-operation, they thought, was demanded by interest and necessity alike; and though the authors foresaw that the French would at present reject it, they were convinced that the time would come when such a union would put an end to French turmoil and ills. The two nations were in one respect complementary: Britain had at its disposal accumulated trade capital, France a fertile soil. More important was their community of political ideas. Britain had behind it one hundred and thirty years of the parliamentary government upon which the French were now embarking; the constitutional party in France would find in the British nation support against both the defenders of despotism and those of an extravagant liberty. France was the only nation on the continent of Europe, all the other states were only governments; between France and Britain nation could speak to nation and influence the governments to act according to the national will. Assembly of the Champ de Mai adopted the Acte additionnel which Napoleon proposed to meet the demands for liberal reforms after his return from Elba. It was accepted without enthusiasm and without confidence: Napoleon did not like concessions so contrary to his personality and temperament, the people found them insufficient to safeguard liberty against the return of despotism.
But whatever their feeling toward Napoleon, most Frenchmen were willing to fight. They resented the returning Bourbons and emigr&s even more than they did Napoleon, they were eager to preserve the social gains of the Revolution, and they were bitter at the humilitation of France by the invadling armies. For the first tiime genuine national feeling seemed to rally around Napoleon. It was too late. Waterloo brought the Bourbons back, and though the peace termrs were generous and mild and France was preserved within its territorial frontiers of 1791, the fall from towering heights of glory and power had been too steep not to leave its mark upon French national pride. Waterloo was regarded as an English victory, the outcome of the long wars of the Revolution as a British triumph; emotionally, French nationalism was to be directed for many years against England. Their commron ideal of liberty did not, as Saint-Simon and Thierry had hoped, unite the two nations in the face of a Europe in which nationalism had either not yet awakened the peoples or had taken a definite turn away from the conception of a free society based upon 32 STEWART and DESJARDINS, rational law and rights of citizens to a romantic longing for originality and uniqueness and close comnmunal ties based upon the call of the blood and the lure of the past.
Many Frenchmen, after having conquered and occupied foreign lands and dismembered states, remained deeply resentful for a long tim-e of the peace treaty of i8i 5, which treated them much less harshly than they had treated others. A legendary interpretation of Napoleon revived his cult in France for a short while, and Jacobin fanaticisnm, with its exaltation of the commion weal and engineering of the human soul, still has not died out in France. Nevertheless, in France the liberalism of I789 has proved the most lasting heritage of all. It was only outside France that the essential Napoleonic traits were revived and then only after the nineteenth century, the age of the bourgeoisie and of nationalism, had endLed in the German "spirit of I914" and in Lenin's revolution, both opposed to the principles of 1789.
Napoleon's regime foreshadowed the twentieth-century totalitarians who "regarded weakness as ignoble, laws as superfluous subtleties, and despised parliamentary forms for their allegedly unbearable slowness. They preferred rapid and trenchant decisions as in war and thought unanimity of opinion as essential as in an arnmiy. Opposition they regarded as diisorder, critical reasoning as revolt, the courts as m.ilitary tribunals, the judges as soldiers who must execute the orders of authority, those who were suspect or accused as if they were enemnies and convicted criminals, and. the judgments of the courts as battles in the state of war into which they had transformed government."33 Like Napoleon, they had little 33Slightly paraphrased from CONSTANT, De l'esprit de conquete, p. 25.
